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Groundwater in Spain, as in other arid and semiarid countries worldwide, has been widely used in the 
expansión of irrigated agriculture. In the Spanish Mancha Occidental aquifer, the excessive, and some-
times ¡Ilegal, water abstraction for irrigation has promoted outstanding socioeconomic development in 
the área, but it has also resulted in exploitation of the aquifer and degradation of valuable wetlands. 
Water policies implemented in the región ha ve not yet managed to restore the aquifer and face strong 
social opposition. This paper uses a multi-scale modeling approach to explore the environmental and 
socio-economic impacts of alternative water conservation measures at the farm and basin levéis. It also 
analyzes their comparative cost-effectiveness to help policy makers identify the least costly policy option 
for achieving the goal of the Mancha Occidental aquifer's sustainability. To conduct this analysis, a Math-
ematical Programming Model has been developed to simúlate: the closing-up and taxed-legalization 
of unlicensed wells, uniform volumetric and block-rate water prices, water quotas, and water markets. 
Aggregate results show that net social costs are not substantially different across policy option, so none 
of the considered policy options will be clearly more cost-effective than the others. However, there are 
significant differences between prívate and public costs (at the farm and sub-basin levéis), which will be 
critical for determining the application in practice of these policies. Results show that controlling ¡Ilegal 
water mining (through the legalization of unlicensed wells) is necessary, but is not sufficient to recover 
the aquifer. Rather, effective water management in this área will require the implementation of other 
water management policies as well. Among them, uniform volumetric and block-rate water pricing poli-
cies will entail the lowest net social cost, but will produce important income losses in the smallest and 
most water-intensive farms, which might put at risk the viability of these farms and the social acceptance 
of the policies. Further investigations on social costs, policy enforcement capacity and public participation 
in water management are highly recommended. 
1. The problem: groundwater development and wetlands 
preservation 
Groundwater in Spain, as in other arid or semiarid countries 
worldwide, has been widely used in the expansión of irrigated 
agriculture (Giordano and Villholth, 2007; Llamas and Martínez-
Santos, 2005; Shah et al, 2007). This phenomenon has helped to 
stimulate the socioeconomic development in rural communities 
(Foster and Chilton, 2003; Várela-Ortega, 2007). However, in many 
cases, the largely uncontrolled agricultural groundwater use has 
produced far-reaching environmental and social problems (water 
table depletion, groundwater quality degradation, destruction of 
associated water ecosystem, proliferation of free-riding behaviors) 
(Schuyt, 2005). This is a clear fact in several Spanish aquifers, 
in which groundwater is the primary water source for all uses 
(Garrido et al., 2006), but it is especially remarkable in the Man-
cha Occidental aquifer, a large, over-drafted aquifer extending over 
5000 km2 situated in the inland central región of Castilla-La Mancha 
in the Upper Guadiana river basin. The área presents a continental 
semiarid climate, with an average annual rainfall of 415mm, an 
average annual temperature of 15°C, and potential evapotranspi-
ration rates on the order of 1000 mm/year (CHG, 2007). 
As a consequence of the legal declaration of overexploita-
tion of the Mancha Occidental Aquifer in 1987, water authorities 
implemented pursued the constitution of groundwater user 
associations and the Water Abstraction Plans (WAP). Typi-
cally, these were imposed using a top-down approach. The 
Table 1 
Water Abstraction Plan (2007). 
Farm size (ha) 
0-30 
30-80 
>80 
Vineyard 
Water quotas (m3/ha) 
2640 
2000 
1200 
1000 
CHG (2006). 
WAP forbade drilling new wells or deepening the existing 
ones, and limited annual water abstractions by means of a 
quota system based on farm size, with no compensation (see 
Table 1). 
This program was implemented without the agreement of the 
farmers, who are the main water users, and has faced strong social 
opposition ever since (Schlager and López-Gunn, 2006; Várela-
Ortega and Blanco, 2008). The nearly non-existent institutional 
arrangements between the regional government, water authori-
ties and water users themselves, and the high enforcement cost 
of controlling water abstractions for agricultural irrigation have 
led to the continued exploitation of the aquifer, proliferation 
of numerous unlicensed wells, and generation of environmental 
externalities derived from degradation of the valuable wetlands 
ecosystems associated with the aquifer in 'Tablas de Daimiel' 
National Park (Martínez-Santos et al., 2008). Official sources 
estímate that presently, nearly 50% of the wells in the Mancha Occi-
dental aquifer are unlicensed (approximately 20,000 wells) and 
total water abstractions greatly exceed the Natural Recharge Rate 
(NRR) of the aquifer, estimated to be around 230-240 Mm3/year 
(CHG, 2007). The intensive pumping for irrigated agriculture caused 
noteworthy water table drawdowns (of about 1 m/year), resulting 
in a reduction of the flooded wetland área from 1800 ha to 200 ha 
over the past 30 years. 
This situation is not sustainable and contradicts the European 
Water Framework Directive (WFD) (EC, 2000), which proclaims the 
protection of water resources and aims at achieving 'good ecolog-
ical status' for all water bodies by 2015. The Directive establishes 
a river basin management approach and requires the elaboration, 
including public consultation, of six yearly river basin management 
plans and a program of measures starting in 2009 (articles 11, 13, 
14). A program of measures must include the implementation of 
water-pricing policies by 2010 to provide adequate incentives to 
use water more efficiently and contribute to the recovery of the cost 
of all water services, including environmental and resources costs 
(article 9). Moreover, the WFD suggests that a cost-effectiveness 
analysis (CEA) should be performed in order to achieve the Direc-
tive's goals at lowest cost (Annex III, WATECO, 2002).This analysis is 
key when selecting alternative measures and identifying excessive 
costs that could justify lower objectives as well as the postpone-
ment of the fulfillment of the Directive's objectives (article 4 of 
the WFD). Nevertheless, the Directive hardly describes how to pro-
ceed with the CEA and only a few Northern European countries 
have developed consistent evaluation methods so far. Most of the 
reviewed cost-effectiveness methods have a strong focus on water 
quality issues and consider the river basin scale as an indivisible 
and unique unit for analysis (see for instance, Interwies et al, 2004 
for the Germany context, and Postle et al., 2004 for the UK context). 
The WFD principies and instruments have already been partially 
contemplated in the Special Plan for the Upper Guadiana (SPUG), 
recently approved by the Spanish parliament (CHG, 2007), and 
they will be reflected in the new Guadiana river basin water man-
agement plan by 2010. The SPUG aims at establishing sustainable 
water use in the Upper Guadiana basin by 2027, strengthens the 
participation of the stakeholders in water management and intro-
duces innovative conservation measures for recovering the Mancha 
Occidental aquifer. These measures include campaigns for purchas-
ing irrigation water rights (although some of the recovered water 
volume will be subsequently returned to irrigators for legalizing 
some un-licensed wells); strict regulations to control groundwa-
ter overdrafts and cióse up unlicensed wells; a reforestation plan; 
and complementary measures for promoting rainfed agriculture 
and the cultivation of less water-intensive crops in the área (CHG, 
2007). 
In conclusión, the revisión of the current water policies and 
application of new cost-effective and environmentally sensitive 
policy instruments which guarantee efficient public participation 
in water management processes is one of the major tasks that must 
be addressed by water managers and policy makers in Spain, and 
especially in the Upper Guadiana basin. This paper contributes to 
this debate, evaluating the cost-effectiveness of alternative water 
conservation policies that may reduce water consumption in the 
Mancha Occidental aquifer and, ultimately, promote sustainable 
groundwater management in the Upper Guadiana basin. 
In Section 2, we revise numerous studies that have investigated 
alternative groundwater management instruments, their advan-
tages and disadvantages. However, little attention has been focused 
on the comparative assessment of the cost and effectiveness of dif-
ferent instruments, and rarely has this analysis been made on water 
quantity issues at different spatial scales. One of the key aspects 
of our methodology is the development of a reproducible multi-
scale economic optimization model able to assess environmental 
and socio-economic policy impacts at different spatial scales (at 
farm and sub-basin level). 
2. Theoretical background: policy instruments for 
groundwater management 
Groundwater is considered a 'common pool resource' (rival and 
non-excludable good) and its overexploitation is often explained 
by the model of the Tragedy of the Commons set forth by 
Hardin (1968). Following his model, individual users tend to 
maximize their water consumption, ignoring the impact of their 
extractions on future water levéis. The incentive for any indi-
vidual is to free-ride on the benefits from conservative behavior 
by the others (Olson, 1965). Consequently, the extraction rate 
reached is higher than the optimum social rate, resulting in collec-
tive inefficiencies and groundwater overexploitation (Feinerman, 
1988; Gordon, 1954). In most cases, this disparity is due to lack 
of regulation or insufficient dynamism of the existing institu-
tional arrangements (Millimam, 1956; Schlager and López-Gunn, 
2006). 
Numerous studies have investigated the use of policy instru-
ments to regúlate groundwater withdrawals and promote more 
efficient groundwater use. Since agriculture constitutes the main 
use of water in arid and semi-arid countries, most of these stud-
ies focus on the potential of water conservation instruments in 
irrigation water management. Water use quota systems are likely 
the most widely employed regulatory instruments in control-
ling groundwater pumping and water consumption for irrigation 
(Koundouri, 2004). These mechanisms allow equity issues to be 
taken into consideration and promote transparent reallocation of 
water (Johansson et al, 2002; Wichelns, 1999). Nevertheless, some 
authors (such as Diñar et al., 1997; Molle, 2009; Rogers et al., 
2002; among others) cast doubts on the establishment of quota 
allotments or water use rights as being too inflexible to adapt 
to changing conditions. They furthermore warn of the high costs 
of monitoring processes and measurement controls which would 
be incurred if water quotas are not socially accepted following a 
bottom-up design approach. 
Administered pricing policies are also policy instruments com-
monly analyzed in the literature for their water-saving potential 
and their reputation as appropriate cost-recovery mechanisms 
(Bazzani et al., 2005; Gómez-Limón and Riesgo, 2004; Molle and 
Berkoff, 2007; Tsur et a l , 2004; Várela-Ortega et al., 1998; among 
others). Rogers et al. (2002) argüe that, when water scarcity 
becomes a leading issue, pricing policies may increase efficiency in 
water management as well as improve water reallocation, equity 
and sustainability. However, in spite of their popularity, their appli-
cation remains controversial, especially in developing countries. 
Many studies (see e.g. Cornish et al., 2004; De Fraiture and Perry, 
2007; Molle et al., 2008) indícate that substantial price increases 
are required to induce water saving, which might increase farmers' 
financial vulnerability and endanger the social acceptability and 
political feasibility of water pricing policies. Thus, Chohin-kuper 
et al. (2003) and Molle (2009) state that centralized water prices 
are actually more often used to recover water costs than to reduce 
water consumption, even when water scarcity is high. 
The last two decades witnessed the resurgence of decentral-
ized water management schemes to improve water efficiency 
and confront increasing conflicts among water users (Diñar and 
Subramanian, 1997;Johanssonet al., 2002; Zekriand Easter, 2005). 
Easter et al. (1998) discuss the potential of water markets in a wide 
variety of contexts and argüe that, when transaction costs are low, 
these instruments may provide better water allocation efficiency 
and higher economic benefits than other regulatory approaches. 
Nevertheless, there are numerous conditions necessary to hold 
down transaction costs, and several studies show that in real-
world contexts the apparent superiority of water markets is limited 
(see Garrido and Calatrava, 2010; Johansson et al., 2002; Kemper, 
2001; Koundouri, 2004; Rosegrant and Schleyer, 1996; among oth-
ers). 
Feinerman (1988) claims that in terms of water use efficiency no 
single groundwater management tool is clearly superior to another. 
Feinerman's study also states that equity aspects (i.e. wealth dis-
tribution among individual users) are as important as efficiency 
issues. Past experiences show that the most efficient tool, in eco-
nomic terms, may not be the most suitable solution. Diñar et al. 
(1997) conclude that no single economic instrument can work in 
all situations. 
There are still many uncertainties about the potential of water 
quotas, water pricing and water markets for groundwater demand 
management . The existing studies about the use of economic 
instruments in irrigation water management are limited to spe-
cific local conditions, both physically and institutionally (Bjornlund 
et al., 2007). Therefore, more investigations are needed to provide 
new insights and transferable empirical experiences. 
3. Analytical framework 
3.1. Methodological overview 
The methodology adopted for this research is represented 
schematically in Fig. 1. A detailed step-by-step description of the 
analytical procedures is presented after this figure. 
• Step 1: Creation of a knowledge base. This step comprises the 
site-specific characterization of the study área, selection of the 
representative farms, and estimation of the model 's input coef-
ficients and parameters . It is based on fieldwork, statistical data 
collection, and stakeholder consultation. 
• Step 2: Development of a non-linear Mathematical Programming 
Model (MPM) of constrained optimization to simúlate farmers' 
behavior under different policy scenarios and risk situations. 
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Fig. 1. Methodological overview. 
Step 3: Definition of simulation scenarios, based on literature 
review and stakeholders' suggestions. They includes policies 
devised to control ¡Ilegal water drilling in the aquifer of study 
(Group A), and water management policies designed to reduce 
groundwater consumption for irrigation (Group B). 
Step4: Results and cost-effectiveness analysis. Aset of multi-level 
indicators was used to represent the economic, social and envi-
ronmental performances of the Mancha Occidental's agricultural 
systems at the farm level and sub-basin levéis (Upper Guadiana 
basin). 
3.2. Creation ofa knowledge base 
Farms are considered the basic unit of analysis in agriculture. 
However, modeling agricultural systems confronted with envi-
ronmental issues usually requires integrating farm-scales with 
regional-scales. In this research, the zone of study has been char-
acterized using typologies of farms aggregated at regional scale. 
Typologies have been widely used for representing the complex-
ity of farmers' systems in different Spanish irrigation communities 
(Arriaza et al., 2002; Bjornlund et al, 2007; Gómez-Limón and 
Riesgo, 2004; Iglesias and Blanco, 2008; Várela-Ortega et al., 1998). 
Matón et al. (2005) and Poussin et al. (2008) review different meth-
ods to build typologies. Based on their findings, the "positivist 
method" was selected and applied to this study. First, a statistical 
analysis of official data was performed to study the characteristics 
of the regional agricultural production in the área overlying the 
Mancha Occidental aquifer and to determine the structural char-
acteristics of the representative farm types. This information was 
collected from regional and national Government sources as well 
as from the Guadiana River Basin Authority publications. Subse-
quently, farm typologies were completed by targeted fieldwork 
surveys (30 in total) and personal interviews with the stakehold-
ers (mainly local experts and irrigation communities). Finally, farm 
typologies were clustered according to structural criteria in order 
to obtain homogeneous groups with similar production systems. 
As shown in Table 2, the study región (the Mancha Occiden-
tal aquifer) has been identified as a weighted (by surface) sum 
of four representative farm types (Fl, F2, F3 and F4). Each 'farm 
type' is considered an aggregation of homogeneous types of agri-
cultural production systems in terms of growing surface, type of 
wells, water use, soil quality, and crop distribution. 
The Mancha Occidental aquifer covers about 400,000 cultivated 
hectares. Irrigated surface spans an área of 182,000 ha (46% of the 
total cultivated área), from which almost 60,000 are allegedly being 
irrigated from unlicensed wells. The farm types Fl and F2 rep-
resent fully irrigated agricultural systems in which licensed and 
unlicensed wells coexist and water consumption rates exceed the 
water abstraction quotas imposed by the Guadiana River Basin 
Authority. These production systems are concentrated in small-
medium holdings with good soil qualities and high value-added 
crops, such us vegetables and irrigated vineyards which, being dif-
ficult to map using satellite imagery, are often illegally irrigated. On 
the other hand, the average size of farms F3 and F4 is larger. These 
farms have more diversified crops (barley, wheat, maize, vegeta-
bles, and vineyards) than the farm F2, and combine rainfed and 
irrigated agricultural productions in different soil qualities. Only 
licensed wells are used to pump water for irrigation, though they 
also use more water than that allowed by the WAP. As we are con-
sidering the cost of compliance with the WFD, which includes the 
environmental costs related to the aquifer's degradation, we have 
not selected any completely 'legal' representative farm (that is, a 
farm that complies with the WAP and has no unlicensed wells), 
although they also exist in the región. 
3.3. Development ofa Mathematical Programming Model 
The model used to perform this analysis is a non-linear single-
year static MPM of constraint optimization defined at regional scale 
(sub-basin aggregation). It complements previous modeling work 
developed by Iglesias (2002), Várela-Ortega (2007), and Várela-
Ortega et al. (1998) at plot scale in the same área of study. 
According to the expected utility theory of Von Neuman and 
Morgenstern (1994), farmers are considered rational and self-
interested individuáis with well ordered preferences that try to 
maximize their utility choosing among alternative farm plans. In 
the present study, the model maximizes a utility function subject 
to land, labor, water, and policy constraints. The utility function is 
defined by a profit function and a risk vector that takes into account 
climate as well as market prices variations (see Appendix A for 
detailed specifications). Several studies (such as Ellis, 1993; Huirne 
Table 2 
Representative farm types. 
Characteristics 
Total growing surface (ha) 
Average farm size 
Irrigated surface (%) 
Water use (m3/ha) 
Water quotas3 
Actual water consumption' 
Number ofwellsc 
Licensed/Unlicensed (%) 
Irrigated hectares per well 
Soil type (bad/good soil) 
Crop distribution (%) 
Cereals (barley, wheat) 
Maize 
Vegetables 
Vineyard 
Set-aside 
Total área (%) 
Surface weight (%) 
Representative farms 
Fl 
56,667 
10(very small) 
100 
2220 
3390 
12,401 
61/39 
4 
39/61 
30.0 
0.0 
30.0 
30.0 
10.0 
100 
25 
F2 
55,254 
35 (médium) 
100 
1500 
1906 
18,266 
13/87 
3 
20/80 
18.0 
0.0 
5.0 
75.0 
2.0 
100 
24 
F3 
38,838 
75 (big) 
80 
1600 
2371 
3824 
100/0 
8 
58/42 
45 
2.0 
14.0 
28.0 
11.0 
100 
17 
F4 
76,741 
265 (very big) 
50 
1000 
2371 
4723 
100/0 
8 
80/20 
63.7 
0.3 
10.0 
10.0 
16.0 
100 
34 
Aquifer 
227,500 
23 
80 
1527 
2514 
39,214 
40/60 
5 
51/49 
41.0 
0.4 
14.5 
33.8 
10.3 
100 
100 
Own elaboration based on official statistics (CHG, 2007; ÍES, 2006) and farmers' surveys (2005 and 2006). 
a
 Water quotas established by the WAP (CHG, 2006). 
b
 Actual water consumption is calculated based on the prevailing crop distribution and corresponding crop water requirements. 
c
 This is an estímate of the total number of wells. The number of wells actually in use is known (around 8000). 
Table 3 
Simulated policy scenarios. 
Group of 
scenarios 
Objective Simulated policy scenarios Description of simulated policy 
scenarios 
Policy options for managing... 
Unlicensed water usea Licensed water usea 
Regulatory objective: Controlling 
illegal groundwater consumption' 
Environmental objective: 
Reducing irrigation groundwater 
consumption to assure the 
aquifer's recharge 
Closure of unlicensed 
wells 
Taxed legalization of 
unlicensed wells 
Taxed legalization of 
unlicensed wells 
Prevailing water quota 
system (WAP) 
Uniform water pricing 
Block-rate water 
pricing 
New water quota 
system 
Water rights market 
Fierce control of groundwater 
over-drafts: 
< licensed extractions respect the WAP 
< all unlicensed wells are closed-up 
Modérate control of groundwater 
over-drafts: 
< licensed extractions respect the WAP 
< unlicensed wells are legalized by 
paying an entry right fee of 6000 € per 
irrigated hectarec 
Gradual increase of0.02€/m3 in water 
price for forty price levéis (Pl P40) 
Set of prices ( t - t"€/m 3 ) and 
quantities delivered (% of water 
allotment right): (i) r=0.07€/m3 , 
0-33%: (ii) t = 0.014€/m3,33-66% 
(f >t);(iii)tt" = 0.021 € /m 3 , 66-100% 
(.tt">t>) 
Non-tradable groundwater extraction 
rights (equally distributed per hectare 
of irrigated surface). Total water 
abstractions are limited to the NRR of 
the aquifer. 
Previous administered water use rights 
are exchanged. The market equilibrium 
price is set using the dual valúes of the 
preceding simulation results (new 
water quota system scenario). 
Transaction costs of 5% are considered. 
From now on, 'unlicensed water use' refers to the water extracted from unlicensed wells and 'licensed water use' refers to the water extracted from licensed wells. 
'Illegal groundwater consumption' comprises the water pumped from unlicensed wells and the water consumed over the quotas established by the WAP. 
This policy option is contemplated in the recently approved SPUG (CHG, 2007). 
et al., 2000; Hardaker et al., 2004) provide empirical evidence 
that risk and uncertainty situations genérate income instability, 
affecting farmer decision-making. In that regard, Friedman and 
Savage (1948) demónstrate that farmers are usually 'risk averse' 
(do not wish to take risks) and, therefore, they tend to choose 
less-risky alternatives even ifthat requires renouncing part of their 
potential income. 
In particular, the economic model developed to undertake this 
analysis optimize the regional expected utility, as an aggregation 
of the expected Utilities of the four farm types, while keeping 
the specificity of individual constraints. This twofold characteris-
tic of the model facilitates the mobility of water resources among 
the different farm types, permits the up-scaling of farm-based 
results at the sub-basin aquifer level, and allows analyzing the com-
plex social, physical, and economic interactions between legal and 
illegal groundwater uses in a more integrated way. Similar multi-
scale programming models have been recently developed by Alary 
and Deybe (2005), Flichman et al. (2006), Henseler et al. (2009), 
Medellín-Azuara et al. (2010), and Rounsevell et al. (2003), for inte-
grated regional analysis. These studies indícate that different farms 
can be aggregated at regional level and represented by a unique 
MPM under conditions of homogeneity. Day (1963) and Buckwell 
and Hazell (1972) demónstrate that technologically homogeneous 
and pecuniously and institutionally proportional farms (Le., farms 
with the same possibilities of production, agroclimatic conditions, 
levéis of technology, availability of resources, management capac-
ity, etc.) can be grouped together with relatively small problems 
of aggregation bias. In addition, Gómez-Limón and Riesgo (2004), 
indícate that, when decisions are based on the same decision-
making criteria (in our case, the utility's maximization), farm types 
can be modeled by means of a unique MPM. 
The model was calibrated with the risk-aversion coefficient1 and 
validated using the Percentage Absolute Deviation2 (PAD) param-
eter to verify the actual crop distribution (main decision-making 
variable in the model) in each farm type. PAD valúes range from 3.5% 
to 16%, which are below the threshold valué of 20% that determines 
the rejection of a model (Hazell and Norton, 1986, p. 271). 
3.4. Simulation scenarios 
Foster and Chilton (2003) and Tuinhof et al. (2003) identified 
different hydraulic stress stages of groundwater resource develop-
ment analyzing the impacts of abstraction rates and proliferation 
of wells over time. The critical situation of the Mancha Occidental 
aquifer could be associated with a stage of 'unstable groundwa-
ter development' in which inaction might lead to an irreversible 
degradation of the aquifer and severe social conflicts among stake-
holders. To avoid this undesirable outcome, the combination of an 
adequate regulatory framework with water demand management 
policies has been highly recommended by water experts (e.g. Diñar 
et al., 1997; Kemper, 2007; Tuinhof et al., 2003). Following these 
recommendations, different policy options were combined to, first, 
control illegal water consumption (as a base of an appropriate regu-
latory framework) (group of policy scenarios A), and second, reduce 
groundwater demand for irrigation to comply with the WFD's envi-
1
 The risk aversión parameter selected was 1.65. It indicates that the probability 
to have an income higher or equal to Z is 95% with an error of the hypotheses test 
lowerto5%. 
2 P A D(%) = 5^"-n | ^ - x c | W0/J2"c-„X~C'-X~c: otJserved surface: Xc: simulated 
surface. 
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NRR: Natural Recharge Ratc of the Mancha Occidental aquifer 
Fig. 2. Water consumption for irrigation in the Mancha Occidental Aquifer under 
different policy scenarios for eliminating groundwater overdraft. 
ronmental objectives (group of policy scenarios B).3 Table 3 briefly 
summarizes the simulated policy scenarios. 
To accomplish the first objective, the authors evalúate alterna-
tive policy options for eliminating 'unlicensed water use' (primary 
cause of'illegal groundwater consumption') under the assumption 
that the current WAP is still in place. To reach the second objective, 
the cost and effectiveness of alternative water demand manage-
ment policies are analyzed, assuming that all unlicensed wells have 
been previously legalized. 
The different policy and management options were selected 
based on a review of the literature (see Section 2) and stakehold-
ers' requests. Several stakeholder meetings were held as part of 
a participatory process conducted from 2005 to 2008 within the 
framework of the Ne Water project.4 In particular, three stakeholder 
meetings, thematically oriented around economic, hydrological 
and institutional aspeets of irrigation groundwater management, 
served as basis for scenario building.5 Each meeting was attended 
by roughly 25 stakeholders from different groups: farmers, irri-
gation communities, environmental conservation groups, regional 
departments (of environment and agriculture), Guadiana River 
Basin Authority, etc. 
Throughout the consultation process, stakeholders were 
encouraged to suggest, explicitly for the study área, different water 
management policies which might potentially reach the goal of 
aquifer sustainability. Stakeholders' suggestions basically stressed 
the reform of the on-going water policies and the implementation 
of new water management options (Várela-Ortega, in revisión). The 
current WAP is highly criticized by farmers for restricting their his-
torical water rights (4280 m3/ha) and establishing differentiated 
water quotas according to the cropping distribution and farms' sur-
face, which created unpleasant frictions between small and large 
landowners-irrigators. Thus, stakeholders were very interested in 
exploring the cost and effectiveness of a more equitable water 
quota system and new decentralized water policies, such as the 
establishment of water pricing schemes or a water rights market. It 
is worth mentioning that discrepancies aróse among stakeholders 
when discussing the best option for eliminating unlicensed ground-
water use (Martínez-Santos et al., 2010). While the environmental 
conservation groups request a strict application of the law and ask 
3
 All wells are equipped with groundwater metering devices. We assume that 
water consumption can be fully metered. 
4
 NeWater (New ApproachestoAdaptive Water Management under Uncertainty) 
is a 4-year (2005-2009) Integrated Project funded by the European Union's 6th 
Framework Research Program (n°: FP6-2003-GLOBAL-2-SUSTDEV-6.3.2 - 511179-
2) (www.newater.info). 
5
 Detailed information about the development and main results of the stakeholder 
consultation process are provided by Martínez-Santos et al. (2008, 2010), Várela-
Ortega (in revisión), and Zorrilla et al. (2010). 
for fining of illegal pumpers as well as closing up all unlicensed 
wells, the irrigators suggested a 'second chance' and advócate for 
finding an agreement with the government that will allow them to 
register their unlicensed wells. In between these disparate view 
points, the Guadiana River Basin authority, which is the ageney 
responsible for water management in the basin, is urged to enforce 
the law and close-up unlicensed wells, but has no means by which 
to do so and prefers to avoid such an unpopular and costly task. 
4. Simulation results and discussion 
4.1. The open access problem: strengthening of groundwater 
regulatory framework 
The baseline scenario6 represents the current situation of 
the Mancha Occidental aquifer, in which total groundwater 
abstractions (460 Mm3) largely exceeds the NRR of the aquifer 
(240 Mm3). Irrigators do not comply with the existing water quota 
regime (WAP)7 imposed by the Guadiana River Basin Authority to 
recover the exhausted aquifer (335 Mm3 of water for agriculture 
is extracted from licensed wells), neither respect the prohibition 
to extract water from unlicensed wells (approximately, 127Mm3 
of water is illicitly extracted). Fig. 2 shows the impact on total 
groundwater consumption of the application of different policy 
options for eliminating groundwater overdrafts in the Mancha 
Occidental aquifer. 
The simulation results indícate that any attempt to restrain 
'licensed water abstractions' (water extracted from licensed wells), 
e.g. through a strict enforcement of the current WAP, would be 
ineffective unless 'unlicensed water abstractions' (water extracted 
from unlicensed wells) are previously controlled. As evidenced in 
Fig. 2 (WAP scenario), farms in which legal and illegal wells coexist 
(such as, the small and médium farms Fl and F2) would try to inten-
sify their water abstractions from unlicensed wells to compénsate 
their losses for complying with the WAP. Consequently, total water 
consumption in the aquifer would be only slightly reduced (from 
460 Mm3 to 370 Mm3). Experiences from the past suggest that this 
situation might provoke a heavy clash between 'legal' and 'ille-
gal' irrigators, increasing the already existing social tensions and 
free-riding behaviors in the región (Martínez-Santos et al., 2008; 
Várela-Ortega, 2007). Thus, overcoming groundwater overdrafting 
would require an effective combination of measures addressed to 
control water consumption and halting illegal drilling at the same 
time. Table 4 shows the model results of the WAP scenario and the 
application of alternative policy options (closure and legalization 
of unlicensed wells) for controlling 'unlicensed water abstractions', 
assuming that all irrigators comply with the current WAP. Disaggre-
gated results on water consumption farm income, publie revenue 
collection and expenditure, and crop distribution are displayed in 
Table 4. In the present study, the net publie expenditure is calcu-
lated as the gross publie expenditure minus the publie collection. 
Public collection refers to water fees and charges collected by the 
water authority (basically, water use tariffs, taxes per well, and 
taxes paid for registering the unlicensed wells), whereas the gross 
publie expenditure comprises the CAP subsidy payments for crops 
and land paid by the government and will mainly depend on the 
cropping distribution of the farms. 
Closing up unlicensed wells would, in fact, reduce irrigation 
groundwater consumption to a volume compatible with the sus-
6
 The prevailing situation of the Mancha Occidental aquifer in 2007 is considered 
the baseline scenario or reference situation. 
7
 The WAPestablishes a máximum water volume of 200 Mm3 tobe yearly diverted 
to the agricultural sector (CHG, 2006). The structure of the WAP water quotas is 
shown in Table 1. Table 2 includes the WAP water quotas by representative farm. 
Table 4 
Effects of different policy options for eliminating groundwater overdrafts in the Mancha Occidental aquifer. 
POLICYINDICATORS 
POLICY 
SCENARIOS 
Baseline scenario 
Fl- Small farm 
F2- Médium farm 
F3- Big farm 
F4- Very big farm 
WAP scenario 
Fl- Small farm 
F2- Médium farm 
F3- Big farm 
F4- Very big farm 
Closure of unlicensed w 
Fl- Small farm 
F2- Médium farm 
F3- Big farm 
F4- Very big farm 
Taxed leg. of unlicensed 
Fl- Small farm 
F2- Médium farm 
F3- Big farm 
F4- Very big farm 
Water 
use 
(m3/ha) 
3390 
1906 
2371 
2372 
3195 
1828 
1600 
1000 
ells 
1539 
525 
1600 
1000 
wells 
2878 
1633 
1600 
1000 
Jll 
1063 
604 
534 
391 
1053 
597 
517 
337 
811 
23 
517 
337 
920 
285 
517 
337 
Public 
coUection 
(€/ha) 
3.1 
1.6 
3.6 
2.4 
3.1 
1.6 
3.6 
2.4 
3.1 
1.6 
3.6 
2.4 
133 
312 
3.6 
2.4 
Public 
expenditure 
(€/ha) 
117 
56 
153 
185 
113 
55 
142 
179 
109 
51 
142 
179 
106 
51 
142 
179 
Crop distribution (%) 
Rainfed Viney 
5 
3 
20 
18 
7 
: 
20 
30 
75 
28 
50 
30 
75 
58 
84 
55 
77 
58 
84 
59 
58 
84 
Cereals Veg. 
34 
10 
• 
30 
75 
31 
17 5 
38 14 
30 10 
21 31 
13 5 
28 fl^H 
10 0 6 
22 • 23 
20 0 3 
28 0 14 
10 0 6 
0 31 
0 5 
28 0 14 
10 0 6 
Percentage of surface occupied by 
Percentage of surface occupied by 
Percentage of surface occupied by 
Percentage of surface occupied by 
rainfed crops in a representative farm, by policy scenario 
irrigated vineyard in a representative farm, by policy scenario 
irrigated cereals in a representative farm, by policy scenario 
vegetables in a representative farm, by policy scenario 
tainable management of the aquifer (approximately 200 Mm3) (see 
Fig. 2). However, the enforcement of such policy seems problem-
atic due on one hand, to the large transaction costs in which public 
authorities would incur to cióse the large number of unlicensed 
wells and to the other hand, to the high income losses inflicted 
upon some farmers. As we can see in Table 4, the médium farm F2 
would see its income gains reduced by 96% (from 604 to 23€/ha), 
as a consequence of a major shift from irrigated to rainfed agri-
culture with less economic profitability (74% of the total irrigated 
surface, mainly vineyard, would be transformed into rainfed crop-
land). Two main reasons can explain this switch in land use: first, 
obviously, is the strong reduction in water consumption (from 1906 
to 525m3/ha, see Table 4) caused by the closure of wells (almost 
60% of the water used by the farm F2 is pumped from unlicensed 
wells); and second is the low crop diversification potential of the 
farm in question. Irrigated vineyard spans over 75% of the farm's 
growing surface, limiting the possibility of adjusting the cropping 
pattern within the farm to reduce water consumption in the short-
term. In that regard, Martínez-Santos et al. (2008) indícate that 
there are not many other lucrative and water-efficient crops to be 
used as alternatives to irrigated vineyards in the área. 
On the other hand, Table 4 shows that the legalization of unli-
censed wells would entail milder income losses to farms Fl and 
F2 (15% and 47%, respectively) and would preserve irrigated vine-
yards and vegetables. From the public point of view, the model 
results indícate that public expenditure is almost equivalent in 
all simulated scenarios. However, public coUection would greatly 
increase in the legalization scenario (from 2.5 to 110€/ha on aver-
age) because of the taxes collected by the water authority for 
registering unlicensed wells, offsetting gross public expenditure in 
farms Fl and F2. Notwithstanding the positive aspects of the legal-
ization of unlicensed wells in comparison to the closing up scenario, 
this policy option would trim down groundwater use for irriga-
tion to 340 Mm3, but would not guarantee the sustainability of the 
Mancha Occidental aquifer (see Fig. 2). For accomplishing the envi-
ronmental objective the prevailing WAP, which constrained only 
the 'licensed groundwater use', should now be transformed in such 
a way that the water quotas also include the water extracted from 
the new legalized wells. In Section 4.2, a new water quota system 
is analyzed, as well as other groundwater demand instruments for 
reducing water consumption. 
4.2. The role of water management polides to achieve 
conservation goals 
This section shows a selection of the results obtained in 
the simulation of policy scenarios aiming at reducing irrigation 
groundwater consumption (to 240Mm3) to assure the aquifer's 
sustainability. Table 5 shows the model results of the application of 
alternative water management policies, under the assumption that 
all unlicensed wells have been previously legalized. Disaggregated 
results on the environment (water consumption and crop distribu-
tion), prívate sector (farm income), and public sector (government 
revenue coUection and expenditure) are displayed in Table 5. 
4.2.2. Water priáng 
Groundwater irrigation farmers usually pay the full finan-
cial cost of groundwater use (capital costs and maintenance and 
operation costs), however seldom assume the environmental and 
resource costs of groundwater abstractions (Garrido et al, 2006; 
Llamas and Martínez-Santos, 2005; Shah et al., 2007). The national 
report from the Spanish Ministry of the Environment on water pric-
ing and cost recovery in Spain (MMA, 2007) points out that in the 
Guadiana basin, the average financial cost of groundwater services 
is O.lOe/m3 with a cost recovery level among agricultural users 
of 90-100%. Garrido and Calatrava (2010) state that water tariffs 
should be doubled if environmental costs are included in the water 
services costs. In the Mancha Occidental aquifer, irrigators already 
pay the full economic cost of groundwater abstractions, estimated 
to be 0.08€/m3. As evidenced in Fig. 3, our findings indícate 
that additional water tariffs, ranging between 0.11 and 0.21 €/m3, 
should be implemented in the Mancha Occidental aquifer for fully 
Table 5 
Effects of water management policies for promoting sustainable groundwater use in the Mancha Occidental aquifer. 
Policy scenarios Policy indicators 
Water consumption (m3/ha) Farm income (€/ha) Public collection (€/ha) Public expenditure (€/ha) Crop distribution {%) 
Rainfed 
5 
3 
20 
50 
59 
20 
59 
81 
59 
20 
59 
81 
54 
26 
61 
80 
54 
25 
61 
81 
Irrigated 
95 
97 
80 
50 
41 
80 
41 
19 
41 
80 
41 
19 
46 
74 
39 
20 
46 
75 
39 
19 
Baseline scenario 
Fl: Small farm 
F2: Médium farm 
F3: Bigfarm 
F4: Very big farm 
3390 
1906 
2371 
2372 
Uniform w. pricing (P1 = 0.21 € /m 3 ) 
Fl: Small farm 
F2: Médium farm 
F3: Bigfarm 
F4: Very big farm 
Block w. pricing (P2 
Fl: Small farm 
F2: Médium farm 
F3: Bigfarm 
F4: Very big farm 
Water use quota 
Fl: Small farm 
F2: Médium farm 
F3: Bigfarm 
F4: Very big farm 
Water markets (P3 = 
Fl: Small farm 
F2: Médium farm 
F3: Bigfarm 
F4: Very big farm 
1079 
1592 
1469 
1242 
= 0.11€/m3) 
1079 
1592 
1469 
1242 
1337 
1337 
1337 
1337 
0.24 € /m 3 ) 
1337 
1351 
1337 
1315 
1063 
604 
534 
391 
496 
-43 
255 
232 
612 
87 
386 
294 
775 
235 
480 
372 
775 
236 
480 
373 
3.1 
1.6 
3.6 
2.4 
273 
637 
250 
133 
156 
507 
120 
71 
46 
299 
3.6 
2.2 
46 
303 
4.5 
4.5 
117 
56 
153 
185 
113 
51 
142 
178 
113 
50 
142 
178 
111 
52 
142 
178 
111 
52 
142 
178 
recovering the environmental costs associated to the aquifer's 
degradation. These levéis of water tariffs reduce groundwater con-
sumption to 240 Mm3 (equivalent to the NRR of the aquifer) and 
therefore, they promote the recovery of the aquifer, which is essen-
tial for the restoration of the valuable groundwater-dependent 
wetland ecosystems of the Tablas de Daimiel National Park. Based 
on the 'replacement cost method' (Turner et al, 2004), the water 
prices needed to achieve the environmental target of the aquifer's 
conservation were used to measure the environmental costs associ-
ated with the use of groundwater for irrigation. The aggregate water 
demand response for the two types of selected price schemes (uni-
form volumetric and block-rate water pricing) is shown in Fig. 3. 
The model results indícate that block-rate tariffs are more water 
saving than uniform tariffs. In other words, higher water prices 
would be needed with a uniform volumetric water pricing sys-
tem to reduce groundwater consumption to 240 Mm3. As we can 
see in Fig. 3, it would be necessary to apply a uniform tariff of 
0.21 €/m3 to achieve the desired reduction in groundwater con-
sumption, whereas a lower block-rate tariff of 0.11 €/m3 would be 
enough to accomplish the same objective. 
On the whole, Fig. 3 shows that movements along the demand 
curve result in significant water savings. However, a disaggregated 
analysis reveáis that water demand responses are not uniform 
across farm types due to their diverse structural parameters (basi-
cally, crop distribution and farm size). Similar results have been 
obtained by Bazzani et al. (2005), Gómez-Limón and Riesgo (2004), 
and Várela-Ortega et al. (1998), among others. Fig. 4 shows the 
results of the application of uniform volumetric water prices on 
the selected farm types of the Mancha Occidental aquifer. 
The simulation results indícate that water demand is less elas-
tic at low prices in small and médium farms Fl and F2. In the 
médium farm F2, in particular, water demand is completely inelas-
tic bellow 0.1l€/m3, which means that water prices should be 
incremented 5 times before they will induce significant water sav-
ings. The inelasticity of water demand at low water price ranges 
may induce important farmers' income losses, limiting the appli-
cability of water pricing schemes in real-world contexts (see e.g. 
Cornish et al., 2004; De Fraiture and Perry, 2007; Molle et al, 2008). 
At the same water price level (0.11 €/m3), bigger farms F3 and F4 
would save larger amounts of water, evidence of the presence of 
regional economies of scale. However, farm size is not the only fac-
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Fig. 5. Farmers' cropping strategies under uniform volumetric water prices. 
tor that determines water demand responses. Water savings are 
clearly conditioned by potential land use changes. Crop diversified 
farms, such as F3 and F4, can adopt more flexible adaptive strategies 
and easily adjust their crop mix to decrease water consumption. 
These farm types combine rainfed and irrigated agricultural pro-
ductions in different soil qualities and are capable of substituting 
irrigated cereal crops (such as barley, wheat, and maize) by rain-
fed crops (mainly, barley) for reducing water consumption without 
sacrificing a large part of their income. On the other hand, the 
representative farm F2 has a very rigid cropping pattern (based 
on irrigated vineyard crops) and therefore, it presents a very low 
price-responsive water demand. Similarly, the representative farm 
Fl, with very low diversification potential and high value-added 
crops (such as vegetables and to a lesser extent, vineyards), sub-
stitutes water intensive crops (pepper) by less water demanding 
crops (melón or vineyard) at low prices, but it is constrained to 
replace vegetable crops with rainfed crops when water prices are 
high, reducing water consumption and farm income substantially. 
As evidenced by the data in Fig. 4, a water price level of 0.21 €/m3, 
would induce a reduction in water consumption of 68, 21, 45 and 
52%, in farms Fl, F2, F3 and F4, respectively. Fig. 5 illustrates the 
cropping strategies adopted by farmers facing increasing uniform 
volumetric water prices in the Mancha Occidental aquifer. 
The simulation results also indícate that the establishment of 
water prices as a mechanism to reduce groundwater consump-
tion and assure the regeneration of the Mancha Occidental aquifer 
would have adverse effects on farmers' income in the región. Fig. 6 
shows farmers' income under uniform volumetric and block-rate 
water prices. 
Figs. 3 and 6 point out that, when uniform volumetric and 
block-rate water prices reach 0.21 €/m3 and 0.1l€/m3 respec-
tively, farmers' would sacrifice 58% and 40% of their income gains 
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for reducing 50% their water consumption, which may be neither 
politically ñor socially acceptable. Disaggregated results displayed 
in Table 5 show that, at that uniform water price level (0.21 €/m3), 
the médium farm F2, specialized in growing irrigated vineyard, 
would even go out of farming (negative income). Irrigated vine-
yards as well as horticultural crops play a substantial role as a 
source of employment and income generation. Thus, alternative 
choices should be considered to reduce water use in vineyard inten-
sive farms, because putting at risk the viability of these farms might 
severely curtail the economy of the región. 
4.2.2. Water quotas 
As an alternative to the prevailing WAP, a new water use quota 
system was devised to limit total groundwater abstractions for 
irrigation to 240 Mm3 per year (water volume compatible with 
the Mancha Occidental aquifer's recharge rate). Unlike the cur-
rent WAP, this global quota was equally distributed across types 
of farms in such a way that each farm was assigned a non-tradable 
groundwater use right of 1337 m3/ha.8 The simulation results in 
Table 5 show that this water allotment reallocation would favor 
larger farms F3 and F4 more than small and médium farms Fl and 
F2. In comparison with the baseline scenario (see Table 5), big farms 
F3 and F4 would see their income gain reduced only by 10% and 5% 
respectively, whereas the smaller farms Fl and F2 would lose 27% 
and 61% of their income. 
Regarding the publie sector, it is worth mentioning that pub-
lic collection would substantially increase in farms Fl and F2, 
especially in the latter (299e/h, in Table 5), as it comprises the 
legalization fees paid by irrigators for registering unlicensed wells 
to enter in the new water quota system. Besides that, publie expen-
diture will slightly decrease in all farms due to expansión of rainfed 
crops in the cultivated área (rainfed crops received lower direct 
CAP subsidies than irrigated crops). Rainfed surface would increase 
from 5%, 3%, 20% and 50% (for farms Fl, F2, F3 and F4, respectively, 
under the baseline scenario) to 54%, 26%, 21% and 80% under the 
quota system scenario. 
4.2.3. Water market 
In this section we take a further step, simulating a water mar-
ket. The water market simulated in this study can be defined 
as an irrigation spot market implemented at sub-basin level. 
Thus, groundwater can be voluntarily and directly traded among 
irrigators within the Mancha Occidental aquifer, but it cannot 
be transferred to other irrigation systems outside the aquifer's 
Fig. 6. Farmers' income under uniform volumetric and block-rate water prices in 
the Mancha Occidental aquifer. 
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 These individual water quotas were obtained by dividing the global water quota 
(240 Mm3) by the total number of irrigation hectares in the área (on the order of 
180,000 ha). 
boundaries, ñor exchanged with water users belonging to other 
production sectors (e.g. residential and commercial sectors). In 
order to guarantee the aquifer's annual recharge rate, total water 
exchanges are limited to a máximum of 240 Mm3 per year. The 
initial allocation of groundwater rights for each farm corresponds 
with the established water use quotas of the previous simulation 
scenario (1337 m3/ha, that is, 75, 73, 42 and 50 Mm3 for Fl, F2, F3 
and F4 respectively), in such a way that the sum of initial water 
rights equals the máximum exchangeable amount of water in the 
Mancha Occidental aquifer. Simulation results from the previous 
water use quota scenario have also been used to define the range 
of potential water market prices that provide a win-win situa-
tion (from 0.20 to 0.26 €/m3). These price levéis were identified 
within the range of prices delimited by the lowest and highest 
dual water valúes of the water availability restrictions in the simu-
lated water use quota scenario. Among the possible market prices, 
the equilibrium market price was set at 0.24 €/m3; the level at 
which the expected regional utility is maximized. Since even the 
most efficient water market entails establishment and operation 
costs, it has been considered that water sellers have to pay for the 
transaction costs incurred in the trading (around 5% of the total 
receipts). 
Results indícate that the médium farm F2 buys 0.8 Mm3 
from the largest farm F4, because of the higher marginal util-
ity or opportunity cost of water of small and médium holdings. 
Once the transaction has been completed, total water con-
sumption is 74.6 Mm3 (1351 m3/ha) for farm F2 and 50.5 Mm3 
(1315m3/ha) for farm F4 (see Table 5). Gómez-Limón et al. 
(2007) demónstrate that, for most market price levéis, farm-
ers' willingness to buy water is higher in small and médium 
farms than in large farms. In comparison with the previ-
ous non-market situation (water use quota scenario), water 
trading results in small income gains (farm income is only 
increased in 1 €/ha in farms F2 and F4), and slightly higher 
public collections (303 and 4.5e/ha in farms F2 and F4 respec-
tively). 
4.3. Cost-effectiveness analysis of water management polides 
To conclude our research, a CEA analysis was performed to iden-
tify the most cost-effective policy option to meet the WFD objective 
of water resources conservation in the Mancha Occidental aquifer. 
According to theory in environmental-economic evaluation, the 
purpose of the CEA is to find out how preset environmental objec-
tives (in our case, reducing total groundwater consumption for 
irrigation in the aquifer to reach its sustainable recharge rate, set 
at 240 Mm3) can be attained at least social cost. Following Brouwer 
and De Blois (2008), Semaan et al. (2007), Turner et al. (2004), 
and Zanou et al. (2003), this analysis was developed comparing 
the net social cost of the different simulated water management 
policies with respect to the baseline situation. The most-effective 
water management policy will be that with the lowest net social 
cost. 
Net social costs are calculated as the algebraic sum of prívate 
and social costs related to each policy measure (Mejías et al., 2004; 
Semaan et al, 2007; Várela-Ortega and Blanco, 2008; Várela-Ortega 
and Sumpsi, 1999). Prívate costs refer to farmers' income losses 
and public costs express the government net public expenditure 
(see Section 4.1). Table 6 shows the prívate and public costs of each 
water management policy (with respect to the baseline situation) 
in the Mancha Occidental aquifer. 
Results leads to the conclusión that the most cost-effective 
water management policy would be the establishment of a 
water pricing system, ranked #1 with the lowest net social cost 
(85.3 €/ha). Table 6 shows that uniform volumetric and block-
rate water pricing schemes have the lowest public costs (-314.5 
and -210.5€/ha respectively), but entail the highest prívate costs 
(399.8 and 295.8 €/ha respectively). On the other hand, the water 
use quota system is the most costly water management policy and 
it is ranked #3. This water management policy has the highest 
net social cost (86.9 €/ha), and presents the highest public cost 
(-89.8e/ha). In between, the water market policy instrument is 
ranked #2. It has a net social cost of 85.8 €/ha, but entails the lowest 
prívate cost (176.5€/ha). It is worth mentioning that public costs 
are negative in all cases (government collections are higher than 
government expenditures because of the taxes collected by legal-
izing the unlicensed wells), so public costs should be understood 
as public revenues in Table 6. 
5. Discussion of the results 
The results show that attaining the target of the aquifer's sus-
tainability would require an effective simultaneous combination 
of measures addressed to control water consumption and halting 
illegal drilling. 
Closing up unlicensed wells would reach the environmental 
objective of the aquifer's conservation, but it would be opposed 
by small and medium-size farmers who will undergo acute income 
losses. Taking into consideration that the current WAP is highly 
contested by the farmers and that the water Administration has not 
been capable of enforcing this policy due to the large costs incurred 
in monitoring and metering water consumption, it seems unlikely 
that 20,000 wells (almost the 50% of the wells in the Mancha Occi-
dental aquifer) can be closed. Kemper (2007) and Koundouri (2004) 
warn about the high transaction costs of monitoring individual 
wells, and Molle et al. (2008) inform about the risk of farmers' upris-
ings when imposing extremely costly fines on unlicensed wells. In 
addition, historical evidence shows that any attempts to prosecute 
illegal pumping in the study área ended up in numerous lawsuits, 
still pending to be settled by the Spanish court (CHG, 2007; Llamas 
and Martínez-Santos, 2005). On the other hand, the results show 
that the taxed legalization of unlicensed wells would entail milder 
income losses to farmers and lower enforcement costs to the pub-
lic authorities than the closing-up scenario. In Jordán, a similar 
experiment also proved effective with the legalization in 2005 of 
numerous unlicensed wells. Irrigators were given the opportunity 
to obtain an abstraction license for free, but were encouraged to 
change the legal status of their wells by paying higher tariffs for 
the water abstracted from unlicensed wells (Haddadin, 2006). The 
taxed legalization of unlicensed wells can control illegal ground-
water pumping, but it is not sufficient to recovery the aquifer. 
Rather, effective water management in this área will require the 
implementation of other water management policies as well. 
The establishment of water pricing policies can reduce ground-
water consumption and promote the recovery of the aquifer. The 
results show that water tariffs would induce substantial water 
savings, especially in large crop-diversified farms. Recent stud-
ies on water prices (e.g., Schoengold et al., 2006; Wheeler et al., 
2008) suggest that irrigation water demand is more elastic than 
highlighted in other studies (e.g., Cornish et al., 2004; De Fraiture 
and Perry, 2007; Várela-Ortega et al., 1998) and that water prices 
can encourage water savings even at low rates. Shiferaw et al. 
(2008) demónstrate that well-defined and implemented ground-
water prices in India would induce changes in land allocation and 
the implementation of water saving technologies, inflicting mod-
érate income losses upon the farmers. Our findings indícate that 
groundwater prices promote water saving, but they inflict substan-
tial income losses upon small farms with rigid cropping patterns. A 
comparative policy analysis between the two selected water pric-
ing schemes leads to the conclusión that block-rate water prices 
would provide fewer revenue collections to the water authority, 
Table 6 
Costs and effectiveness of water management policies in the Mancha Occidental aquifer. 
Index Water management policy 
Uniform w. p. (P= 0.21 € /m 3 ) Block-rate w. p. (P= 0.11 € / m 3 Water use quotas Water market 
(P=0.24€/m3) 
Prívate cost 
Public cost 
Net social cost (€/ha) 
Ranked cost-effectivenessb 
€/ha 
%a 
€/ha 
%* 
399.8 
- 6 3 
-314.5 
+244 
85.3 
295.8 
-47 
-210.5 
+163 
85.3 
176.6 
-28 
-89.8 
+69 
86.9 
3 
176.5 
- 2 8 
-90.7 
+70 
85.8 
2 
Percentage of prívate and public cost with respect to the baseline scenario. 
Simulated management instruments have been ranked from 1 to 3, having the #1 the highest cost-effectiveness. 
but would mean lower income losses for farmers. Several authors 
(such as Bar-Shira et al, 2006; Diñar and Subramanian, 1997; Liu 
et al, 2003; Olmstead et al, 2007), highlight the benefits of using 
block-rate water pricing systems for combining efficiency and 
equity considerations and indícate that block-rate pricing, although 
usually applied to the urban water sector, is being progressively 
introduced to regúlate agriculture water uses. 
Equally distributed water quotas can also achieve the envi-
ronmental objective of the aquifer's conservation by reducing 
groundwater consumption and inequity among farmers. Molle 
(2009) and Wichelns (1999) state that quantity-based restrictions 
may induce land use changes in the same way as explicit water 
prices do. In addition, Shiferaw et al. (2008) demónstrate that the 
use of water quotas increase the feeling of equity among farmers 
and encourage groundwater users to cooperate and to act in the 
interest of the collective. 
The results obtained indícate that, when the previously estab-
lished water use quotas are traded on a market-based mechanism, 
only small amounts of water are actually exchanged, provid-
ing small income gains. Shiferaw et al. (2008) also prove that 
groundwater markets in semi-arid áreas are usually not completely 
developed as a consequence of the low profits obtained. Along the 
same Unes Unes, Gómez-Limón et al. (2007) and Zekri and Easter 
(2005) state that intra-sectoral water markets for irrigation result in 
small water trades and minor increases in farmers' income, proving 
fewer benefits than the mainstream neo-classical economic theory 
would advócate for market mechanisms. In the present study, a 
win-win trading situation will occur when market prices vary from 
0.20 to 0.26 €/m3 . These results match with other studies on hypo-
thetical water markets in irrigation districts of southern Spain (see 
for instance Arriaza et al., 2002; Calatrava and Garrido, 2005), which 
document equilibrium prices as being around 0.15-0.30 €/m3 (for 
1000 and 2000 m3/ha of water allotments respectively, in years of 
normal supply). Albiac et al. (2006) also analyze real informal water 
markets for irrigation in a South-eastern basin of Spain, and report 
exchange prices in the range of 0.1-0.4€/m3. 
The cost-effective analysis concludes that any of the water 
management instruments considered in this research has a clear 
advantage, in terms of social costs, overthe others. Similarly, Diñar 
et al. (1997) state that no single economic instrument can work 
in all situations. Alauddin and Quiggin (2008) also confirm that 
no single policy can solve the complex problems related to irriga-
tion water management, and recommend a combination of market 
and non-market measures. However, the differences obtained in 
the present study between prívate and public costs at farm and 
at sub-basin level will be decisive for putting water conserva-
tion policies into practice since they may condition the acceptance 
and involvement of the end-users in the policies' enforcement. 
Accordingly, Zanou et al. (2003) emphasizes that encouraging 
the cooperation and co-ordination among the stakeholders will 
be the least costly way to improve watershed quality in a river 
basin. 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
Complying with WFD principies presents a significant challenge 
for most European basins in terms of management and methodol-
ogy. Particularly, fulfilling the 'polluter pay' principie and the cost 
recovery objective requires the development of novel methodolo-
gies to evalúate their potential impacts and costs. Some studies and 
guidance documents exist, but they need to be further elaborated 
to incorpórate water quantity issues, different spatial scales and 
transferable empirical experiences. The methodology developed in 
this paper attempted to shed light on these questions, analyzing 
the cost and effectiveness of different water conservation policies 
to reduce groundwater consumption and assure the sustainability 
of the Mancha Occidental aquifer. 
In agreement with other authors (Bazzani et al., 2005; 
Gómez-Limón and Riesgo, 2004; Medellín-Azuara et al., 2010; 
Várela-Ortega et al., 1998), our results confirm that the application 
of water management policies would produce differential effects 
across farm types. Most of the studies about CEA are exclusively 
specified at river basin level, missing important differences at local 
scale (in terms of soil, agrarian structure, farmers' behavior, tech-
nological conditions, and site-specific institutional factors) as well 
as important interactions among the different levéis of analysis. 
Our findings demónstrate that a multi-scale modeling approach is 
more realistic and highly recommended. 
The study also shows that various alternative mechanisms can 
be used to attain the target of the aquifer's sustainability. Results 
indícate that the best policy option for establishing an efficient 
regulatory framework to control unlicensed drilling is the taxed 
legalization of unlicensed wells. However, this policy option will 
not be capable of dealing on its own with groundwater overdrafts 
and it will be necessary to apply other water conservation policies 
to attain the aquifer's sustainability target. From this study we can 
infer that none of the considered alternative water conservation 
policies (water pricing, water quota, water market) is clearly more 
cost-effective than the others. 
Aggregate results show that net social costs are not substan-
tially different across policy options. However, there are important 
differences between prívate and public costs (at farm and sub-
basin level), which may influence the political viability of the 
various options. From an overall perspective, uniform volumetric 
and block-rate water pricing policies are the most cost-effective 
instruments to reach the goal of aquifer's sustainability. However, 
both pricing schemes (especially, uniform volumetric water prices) 
will entail important income losses to médium farms with more 
rigid cropping patterns (such as vineyards) and could therefore put 
their viability at risk. The quota system inflicts lower income losses 
upon the farmers, but is the most costly option for the government 
and the least cost-effective instrument to recover the aquifer. The 
water market has the lowest prívate cost, but does not provide as 
much profit gains as the mainstream neo-classical economic the-
ory would suggest. Thus, our results confirm the findings of Diñar 
et al. (1997), and Alauddin and Quiggin (2008) among others, who 
state that no single policy can solve the complex problems related 
to irrigation water management, and recommend a combination of 
market and non-market measures. 
Additional studies on net social costs are highly recommended 
to include long term recurrent costs, as well as policy implemen-
tation and operation costs. Other criteria not considered in this 
research, such as the policy enforcement capacity and level of social 
acceptance, should also be taken into consideration. Experiences 
from the past indícate that water quotas are likely opposed by 
the farmers and entail high costs of monitoring and enforcement. 
Increasing the direct participation and involvement of stakehold-
ers in water management decisions is highly necessary for the 
acceptance of the policies. Notwithstanding the research's limita-
tions, we would like to stress the potential of this methodology 
for environmental-economic modeling and policy analysis. Even 
though no clear cost-effective solutions were found, this methodol-
ogy improves the ability to predict policy impact at múltiple scales 
and provide valuable results for the stakeholders with regards to 
the potential impacts and costs of the WFD in a wide variety of 
contexts and water policy scenarios. 
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Appendix A. Speciflcation of the economic model 
This appendix presents the essential elements of the economic 
model described in the text. While this model was developed for 
application to the Upper Guadiana basin, it was designed to be 
easily adaptable to a variety of situations. 
A. 1. Objective function 
Based on the mean-standard deviation analysis, the objective 
function of the model is: 
MaxU = y2(Zf-(p-af) (1) 
/ 
where Lfis the regional expected utility; Z¡ the average net income 
by farm type (f); 0 the risk aversión coefficient; <7¡ the standard 
deviation of the income distribution by farm type (f). Average farm 
income is calculated as follows: 
Zf = 'Y^2'Y^2gmc,k,r -Xc,k,r,iJ + sfPf • md • numff ~ oc 
c k r i 
•//kipj - hlp • / " ' p , / - /^nviUjj • invc - \vm, - j - • pullc 
P P i i 
- \^wpqj - y^sirrgjj • wtarifi - V w e / í y • wellt¡ (2) 
where Xckrif are the decision-making variables representing the 
growing área by crop type (c), soil type (/<), irrigation technique (r), 
legal status of the water used (i), and farm type (/); gmckr gross 
margin (including the coupled subsidies of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP)); sfp¡ single farm payment (decoupled subsidies 
of the CAP); md modulation rate; numff number of farms; oc fam-
ily labor opportunity cost; flapj family labor; hlp wage for hired 
labor; htp¿ hired labor; nvíriy new vineyard surface; invc annual 
payment of the investment costs incurred in planting new vine-
yards; víny surface of vineyard pulled up; pullc annual payment of 
the costs incurred in pulling up vineyards; wpcy water pumping 
costs; sirrgij irrigated surface; wtarif¡ water use tariff; we//y num-
ber of wells; wellt¡ tax paid by well (not applicable to unlicensed 
wells). 
The standard deviation is generated by a set of states of nature 
defined by climate variability (crop yields) and market variability 
(crop prices) as follows: 
af 
\¿^sn¿^smZsn,smj Zf) 
N 
1/2 
(3) 
where Z, sn,smf is the random income; Nthe combination of the dif-
ferent states of nature (N= 100). 
A.2. Constraints 
Land constraints: 
Availability of land resources. Eq. (4) indicates that the cultivated 
área cannot surpass the potential arable land (surfkj). Eq. (5) limits 
the área under irrigation to the total área of potentially irrigable 
land (sírrgy). 
J2J2Y,Xc-k^f - surfk-f 
c r i 
(4) 
(5) 
Vineyard land acquisitions. Eq. (6) states that the cultivated vine-
yard surface is determined by the current 'plantation rights' 
(svíriy), surface of vineyard pulled up (víriy) and the new vine-
yard plantations (nvíriy). According to the vineyard restructuring 
programs in Castilla-La Mancha, as part of the CAP, vine growers 
are allowed to créate new vineyard plantations (up to max nvin). 
This is a single-period MPM, so we assume that vineyards are in 
full production. 
vi k r 
where \ ^ \ w í , y < max nvin 
i f 
(6) 
Labor constraints. Eq. (7) indicates that the seasonal labor 
requirements must to be covered by total available agricultural 
labor (family, lafapj, and hired labor, lhipj). 
X ^ X ^ í r c ' r ' p 'Xc-k-r-i-f - lafap-f+lhip-f (7) 
c k r i 
Water constraints (and some other relevant hydrology equa-
tions): 
- Water availability at the farm level. Eq. (8) illustrates thatthe crop 
water needs {wr^j) cannot exceed the amount of water available 
at the farm level (wateraj). 
E E E E W I " c ' k ' r 'XcMJ - waterai,f (8) 
c k r i 
- Water availability at the sub-basin level. Eq. (9) limits the total 
water consumption in the aquifer (wcy) to the amount of water 
available at the sub-basin level (twc¡) (usually subjected to the 
Natural Recharge Rate of the Mancha Occidental aquifer). 
/ wci,f < t w c i (9) 
/ 
- Estimation of water pumping costs. Eq. (10) shows how pumping 
costs increase as water levéis in the aquifer decline. In the present 
study, water consumption was used as a proxy for measuring 
changes in groundwater levéis. a¡, fi¡, S¡, are the coefficients of 
the polynomial function of groundwater pumping costs, obtained 
using statistical analysis from experimental field data collection. 
«i • (wcy)2 + fij • wqj + Sj = wpctj (10) 
• Policy constraints. Eq. (11) depicts the EU CAP requirement for 
farmers to set-aside a (Xsakrif) a given fraction (bound by a mín-
imum, smin, and a máximum, smax) of the COP (cereals, oilseeds 
and proteins) growing área (Xcopr(y). 
smin • Y^2Yl'^2XcoP-k-r-i-f ~ E E X / ^ ^ - V - s m a x 
cop k r i k r i 
cop k r i 
• Subsequently, other parameters and constraints are added into 
the model for simulating different water policies (e.g. legalization 
fees, administered water prices, water market prices, transaction 
costs, water trading, etc.). 
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